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DEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE
SINCE 1954
TO EVALUATE the effect of depreciation changes on modernization
expenditures, we need to know how promptly firms adopted the
provisions for liberalized depreciation which were made avail-
able to them, and how much difference these changes made in
their depreciation practices and in the internal cash flow gen-
erated. Such information does not provide us with a measure of
the effectiveness of liberalized depreciation in stimulating mod-
ernization outlays via the demand or cash flow route or by influ-
encing management attitudes toward replacement, but it does
serve to establish whether there were serious limitations to the
effectiveness of the liberalizing provisions arising either from
tardy adoption or the insignificance of adoption with respect to
depreciation practices.
ADOPTION OF THE 1954 INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE PROVTSIONS
Most of the firms included in this study were quite prompt in
adopting the rapid depreciation methods for new depreciable fa-
cilities authorized under the provisions of the Revenue Act of
1954. Only one of the twenty-five companies had continued, as
of the time of the interviews, to rely solely on the straight-line
method. In contrast, fifteen of the firms apparently adopted an
accelerated method in the taxable year 1954, the first year in
which the new depreciation methods might be used. DistributionDEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 31
of the firms by year of adoption of accelerated depreciation is
shown in the following table.
Number of






Partialuse since 1954 1
Continued straight-line 1
Information not certain 1
These findings are somewhat at odds with those noted by Nor-
man Ture in his investigation of use of alternative depreciation
methods under the Internal Revenue Code of Ture found
that as late as 1960, depreciation was calculated exclusively un-
der the straight-line method by a large proportion ("probably
between 70 and 75 per cent") of all corporation income tax re-
turns. Moreover, he also observed a pronounced tendency for
larger corporations to adopt accelerated methods more promptly
than smaller ones. Tax return data upon which Ture's findings
are based indicated that for the entire textile mill products group,
44 per cent of assets acquired from 1954 to 1959 were depre-
ciated on a straight-line basis. For firms with assets totaling less
than $1 million it was 57 per cent; firms with assets totaling $1—
25 million, 53 per cent; firms with assets in excess of $25 million,
42 per cent.
Our findings, on the other hand, are based on interview re-
sponses and on a comparison of the actual annual depreciation
charges of each of the twenty-five companies with the charges
that would have been generated each year had the firms been
using the double declining balance method and a twenty-year
average service life. Interview responses alone are not adequate
for this purpose, since in many cases the executives could not re-
Norman B. Ture, Accelerated Depreciation in the United States, 1954—60,
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call the dates at which the new depreciation methods had been
adopted. Company reports to stockholders were also consulted,
but in many instances the matter was not dealt with directly or
was treated ambiguously.
In an effort to secure additional information, we used company
data to simulate annual depreciation charges on the assumption
that, beginning with the year 1954, capital additions (i.e., capi-
tal expenditures) were depreciated on a twenty-year basis using
a double declining balance formula.35 We then compared these
estimates with recorded depreciation in an effort to determine
whether actual experience indicated that accelerated depreciation
had been used and, if so, to indicate the year in which acceler-
ated depreciation practices were adopted. It was possible to
check the simulation estimates with known company experience
in enough cases to indicate that they were sufficiently depend-
able to serve as a basis for identifying the year in which acceler-
ated depreciation was adopted. The method of identification was
simply one of noting increases in actual depreciation series which
could only be explained in terms of a shift to accelerated depre-
ciation.
How, then, are the differences between our findings and Ture's
to be explained? One possible explanation is that the sample
used in this study does not adequately represent the cotton and
synthetic spinning and weaving segment of the industry, par-
ticularly as the sample does not include a fair representation of
firms with poor profit performances.
But available information relating to profitability provides only
weak support for this explanation. Among the twenty-five firms
within our sample, data on rates of return (after taxes) on stock-
holders' equity was available for fifteen. Among these firms there
were ten with rates of return above the industry averageduring
the period 1954—62 (5.1 per cent), five with below average rates.
The procedure used for computing this simulated depreciation is set forth in
Appendix B. The assumption of a twenty-year service life rests upon statements
made by a number of textile executives that in practice an average service life for
all equipment was about twenty years.
36Theindustry average was compiled from Federal Trade Commission-Securities
Exchange Commission, Quarterly Financial Reports, various issues.DEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 33
In general, however, those firms with rates above the industry av-
erage did not exhibit especially high rates of return. Four of the
ten firms with the higher rates had average rates of less than 6
per cent, and all had average rates of less than 9 per cent (the
average for all manufacturing corporations was 10.3 per cent).
In short, our sample would appear to be biased oniy slightly to-
ward higher-than-industry average profitability.
On the other hand, some additional scraps of information were
available which indicated that companies with very poor profit
performance tended to delay adoption of the 1954 provisions for
accelerated depreciation. It was possible to secure dates of adop-
tion of accelerated depreciation, or to make estimates of such
dates, for six firms producing cotton, synthetic cloth or both,
which were not in our sample. In general, these firms were less
prompt in adopting accelerated depreciation than were the twen-
ty-five firms in the interview sample. Only one of the six per-
manently adopted the provisions in 1954. Among the remaining
five, one adopted accelerated depreciation in 1956, one in 1957,
one in 1962. Still another appears to have gone to accelerated de-
preciation in 1954 and, several years later, to have returned to a
less rapid method. The sixth firm continued to use straight-line
depreciation.
Analysis of the profits of these six firms established the follow-
ing: The firm which permanently adopted accelerated deprecia-
tion in 1954 was one of the most profitable in the entire industry.
The firm which adopted the new depreciation alternative in
1956 showed an average return on investment for the 1954—62
period of 5.1 per cent, the average return for the textile mill
products industry. The remaining four firms showed quite iow
average returns of 3.3 per cent or less.
The sample may have failed to reflect the experience of firms
which disappeared as a result of merger. One large firm in the
sample has been reported as adopting accelerated depreciation
in 1954. This was true for the parent corporation, but it was also
true that this firm subsequently took over the assets of two me-
dium sized corporations which adopted accelerated depreciation
as late as 1959 and 1961.34 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
REDUCTION OF SERVICE LIVES—1961
The October 1961 change in Treasury regulations authorized
firms in the textile industry to use materially shorter service lives
for purposes of computing depreciation on tax returns than those
stipulated in the Internal Revenue Service Bulletin F. The 1961
regulation permitted service lives of twelve years for finishing
equipment and fifteen years for all other basic equipment in the
industry, compared with the fifteen and twenty-five years stipu-
lated in Bulletin F.
The effective reduction in service lives, however, is not so
substantial as this comparison would suggest. Judging from the
firms we investigated, a significantly large number of companies
in the industry were already using shorter service lives for recently
purchased equipment than those in Bulletin F. Nine of the twen-
ty-five companies were using service lives about the same as
those stipulated in the 1961 regulation, five were using service
lives that were somewhat greater but still materially below those
of Bulletin F, while another nine were using lives in line with
the Bulletin F guides.37
The wide variation in experience appears to be attributable
to differences both in management's aggressiveness in proving
to tax agents that shorter lives were justified and in the willing-
ness of the agents to depart from the old Bulletin F stipulations.
A number of executives explained that in more recent years they
had been able to justify the use of lives as short as those on the
1961 schedule and sometimes shorter by keeping records of re-
placement experience, while others stated that they had been
unable to secure shorter lives. Still other firms seemed unaware
that lives shorter than those of Bulletin F were possible prior to
1961.
A common complaint was that equipment used in producing
synthetic textiles was depreciable on approximately the 1961
basis prior to 1961 whereas the same equipment producing cot-
Shorterthan Bulletin F service lives were applied primarily to equipment
purchased in (then) recent years. Older equipment, even in the firms using shorter
lives, was still being depreciated in line with Bulletin F.DEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 35
ton textiles was not. Some cotton textile producing firms alleged
that competitors who produced both cotton and synthetic cloth
within their organizations were able to take advantage of the
shorter lives on the basis of the fact that they produced synthetic
textiles.
One of the major contributions of the 1961 change in tax regu-
lations, therefore, may have been to bring into use a more uni-
form pattern of service lives, thereby reducing discrimination
against those firms who had been unable to secure shorter lives.
Insofar as the sample is representative, this change favored the
medium and small firms. Among the seven large firms reporting,
four appear to have had favorable service life arrangements prior
to 1961, whereas only three of the nine medium sized firms re-
porting and two of the seven small firms indicated such arrange-
ments.38
A possible offsetting factor which cannot be evaluated was the
practice of expensing a substantial part of the cost of installation.
This seems to have been more important when machinery was
modified than when new machinery was installed. Firms using
long service lives apparently expensed substantial amounts of
capital outlays in this way. Several stated that after 1961 agents
became much stricter in their attitudes toward this practice.
All of the firms in the sample promptly altered their depre-
ciation practices to conform to the 1961 change in regulations.
In only one case, did an executive indicate a reluctance on the
part of management to take advantage of the liberalizing depre-
ciation provisions. Since the 1961 provisions regarding service
lives were applicable to all equipment, old or new, these provi-
sions offered significant advantages not only to firms that had
previously been restricted to relatively long service lives on all
equipment in use, but also to a number of firms that had in re-
cent years been able to secure relatively short lives for newly
acquired equipment but had been restricted to longer lives on
older equipment.
38 In his study based on Treasury data, Ture found that smaller corporations
made greater use of shortened service lives than did larger corporations. Ture,
Accelerated Depreciation, p. 183.86 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
Several factors help to explain the more prompt and enthusi-
astic reception of the 1961 provisions than had been accorded
the provisions for accelerated depreciation under the Revenue
Act of 1954. In the first place, the experience gained through
adopting accelerated depreciation undoubtedly contributed to
avoiding a misunderstanding of the advantages in the 1961 pro-
visions. Secondly, the 1961 provisions were unique to the textile
industry. They had come about as a result of aggressive activity
on the part of the industry's own leadership, especially the Amer-
ican Textile Manufacturer's Institute, and in the process had
become a cause célèbre. Interview testimony and industry litera-
ture indicate that firms had come to regard the long service lives
under Bulletin F as a special penalty imposed upon the industry
and, accordingly, accepted the 1961 provisions as a privilege long
overdue.
Of course, the 1961 administrative action was also more dra-
matic and its provisions more readily appreciated. Whereas the
1954 regulation permitted use of a more liberal depreciation ar-
rangement only on new assets newly acquired, the 1961 changes
provided for shorter depreciation lives on previously acquired
assets as well. This is not to suggest that the 1954 regulation
changes were trivial in their consequences for the firm; the prin-
cipal difference in the adoption experience appears to be the
result of a changed attitude on the part of management.
It is also probable that in 1961 there was a greater realization
of the need for modernization. Between 1954 and 1961 the Amer-
ican textile industry experienced tremendous increases in foreign
competition along with a radical shift from cotton to synthetic
fibers. By 1961 there was an increased emphasis on modernization
for survival, and firms were much more aware of the need to
increase the supply of funds available to them to finance such
investment.
EXPERIENCE WITH 1961—62 DEPRECIATION PROVISIONS
Only eight of the twenty-five firms had changed over to the
"guideline" provisions of Revenue Procedure 62-2 1 at the timeDEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 37
of interview, spring and summer of 1968.Theremainder made
use of the 1961 provisions.
Preference for the 1961 provisions does not necessarily indi-
cate that firms were unwilling to avail themselves of the oppor-
tunity to use shorter service lives. Most firms continuing the
1961 arrangements explained that the longer, fifteen year, service
lives on certain basic textile equipment were offset by shorter
service lives on other equipment, providing an over-all average
service life approximating the fourteen-year service life suggested
as the basic textile "guideline" under the 1962 Revenue Proce-
dure. Some firms stated that their existing arrangements worked
out to provide shorter than guideline lives, others found them
"almost as short" and making "very little difference."
An additional reason, however, appears to have been the desire
to retain internal evidence to justify existing depreciation prac-
tices in future dealings with tax agents. Having in the past been
required to justify favorable service lives by producing records of
the firm's actual experience based on replacement of specific
pieces of equipment, many executives regarded it as unwise to
desert this system for exclusive reliance upon the reserve ratio
test set forth in Revenue Procedure 62-21.
A wide difference in attitude toward the reserve ratio test
emerged during the interviews.40 Several firms had never made
any computations to determine where they stood under the test
or had made only tentative estimates for a part of the organiza-
tion. Some stated that existing records did not permit ready com-
putation of the reserve ratio test, and that it would take addi-
tional time before the firm would be able to know where it stood.
The 1961 provisions had established separate service lives for all major types
ofequipment whereas Revenue Procedure 62-2 1 provided for a limited number of
asset classes. Most textile equipment fell in a single class with a guideline life of
fourteen years.
40Accordingto IRS Revenue Procedure (p. 4): "the fundamental concept
underlying the new Procedure is that the depreciation claimed will not be dis-
turbed if the taxpayer's retirement and replacement practices are consistent with
the life used. The reserve ratio test provides a technique for establishing the con-
sistency between the tax life used and the subsequent retirement and replacement
policy of the taxpayer." Cf. Norman Ture, "Tax Reform: Depreciation Problems,"
American Economic Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2 (May 1963), pp. 339 if.38 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
An executive of a very large publicly held firm asserted that
there was no point in making such a test before the three-year
period had been completed, since there was nothing the firm
could do about it anyway and it was inconceivable that the re-
suits would alter their investment practices.
Opinion differed as to the applicability of the test. Some firms
maintained that as long as the 1961 depreciation provisions were
followed the reserve ratio test was not applicable; others were
convinced that it was applicable in any event.
There were also differences in the degree of concern as to the
impact of the test on depreciation practice. Whereas the large
firm mentioned above did not feel the test was worth computing,
others feared that ultimately they could not pass the test and
that current, favorable service lives would be lengthened. In one
small firm the president stated that he had been advised to post-
pone investment expenditures for several years in order to make
the necessary showing of improvement at the end of the grace
period.
"Redepreciation" of OldAssets
Under the composite asset depreciation arrangements set forth
in Revenue Procedure 62-21 in 1962, a firm takes depreciation on
the full value of assets carried on its books whether or not such
assets have been fully depreciated. Under 62-21, when a firm
switches from unit depreciation to composite asset depreciation
all assets in use within an asset class are used in computing the
basis for depreciation. Thus, if a considerable quantity of fully
depreciated assets are still in use, adoption of the 1962 provisions
may result in a very sizeable increase in the value of assets upon
which tax depreciation is taken.
One firm (not among the twenty-five) was interviewed which
had been in financial difficulty and was recently reorganized. The
new management was relying upon funds generated by redepre-
ciating old assets as a basis for avoiding taxes and thereby pro-
viding the funds necessary to modernize his organization. In an-
other case, a controller of a leading publicly held firm expressedDEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 39
amazement that any "competent" financial officer could ignore
the opportunities for tax savings that would result from redepre-
ciating old equipment. When asked if he was not concerned over
the problem of meeting the reserve ratio test in view of the very
large depreciation charges taken in 1962 and 1963, he replied
that he would worry about the test when the day arrived, and
that the tax savings he was getting were "money in the bank."
Firms continuing under the 1961 provisions were not availing
themselves of the opportunity for additional depreciation by
bringing old, fully depreciated assets back on their books. It is
impossible to determine within the scope of this study the ex-
tent to which their action was prompted by a lack of such as-
sets, by fear of future difficulties under the reserve ratio test due to
the increased current levels of depreciation charges, or simply by
a desire to observe "realistic" depreciation practices. There is
some indication that each of these reasons was important. As will
be shown below, our interviews strongly suggest that "realism"
in depreciation practice is an important objective for many firms.
Increases in Depreciation Resulting from 1961 and
1962 Depreciation Changes
It is impossible to separate the impact of the 1961 and 1962
regulation changes but we can observe in a general way the effect
of change in depreciation practice since 1960 among the firms for
which depreciation and capital expenditure data are available. Ta-
ble 2 sets forth percentage increases in depreciation charges be-
tween the two years, 1960 and 1963. It is immediately apparent
that depreciation charges rose very sharply during this period
(the median increase was 47 per cent).
Since the volume of depreciation is determined by the amount
of depreciable assets as well as the formula used to compute de-
preciation, increases in actual depreciation require adjustment to
reflect the substantial increases in capital expenditures which oc-
curred between 1960 and 1963. This adjustment is supplied by
relating the actual depreciation increases to increases which
would have occurred in simulated series. The latter assume the40 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
TABLE 2. Increases in Depreciation Charges 1960—63, Actual
and Simulated Series Compared






Actual Simulated (col. 1 —Co1.2)




2 127 116 +9
3 135 141 —4
4 142 120 +19
5 184 132 +39
6 147 128 +14
7 b b b
8 b b b
Medium
9 118 111 +6
10 134 109 +23
11 169 136 +24
12 194 112 +74
13 147 96 +54
14 178 148 +20
15 129 106 +22
16 190 177 +7
17 193 143 +35
18 136 116 +17
Small
19 145 125 +17
20 b b
21 167 145 +15
22 b b b
23 170 145 +17
24 1.46 105 +39
25 156 123 +22
Median 147 124 +21
SOURCE:Basedon data supplied by firms. For a description of simulation tech-
nique see Appendix B.
aCodedto prevent identification.
bCompanydata not available.DEPRECIATiON EXPERIENCE 41
same original assets and 1960—63 capital expenditures but no
changes in depreciation
Even after this adjustment the increases are impressive. Rela-
tive increases in actual depreciation were as much as 74 per cent
above comparable increases in the simulated series (Table 2) •42
Themedian relative increase for the twenty firms for which data
were available was 21 per cent above the comparable increase for
the simulated series.
There was considerable variation among firms in the relative
changes in depreciation, however. It should be remembered that
increases in depreciation may have stemmed from causes other
than change in the level of capital expenditures. For many firms;
especially the smaller ones, depreciation increases resulted largely
from the use of the shorter service lives (under either the 1961
or 1962 provisions) applied to newly acquired assets. But a sec-
ond factor acting to increase depreciation was the amount of old
assets which were partially depreciated, having previously been
subject to longer lives, and which were now eligible for deprecia-
tion on a shorter life basis under either the 1961 or 1962 basis.
Still a third factor acting to increase depreciation for those firms
under the 1962 provisions was the amount of old assets which
were fully depreciated but which could now be redepreciated if
placed in composite group accounts.
Accordingly, increases in depreciation were influenced not only
by the increases in the level of capital expenditure and shortened
lives on newly acquired assets, but also the firm's experience with
shorter lives for older assets, both partially and fully depreciated.
Since the depreciation history appears to have varied to a
considerable extent from firm to firm it is not possible to draw
conclusions as to the effectiveness of the 1962 relative to the
1961 regulations in increasing depreciation. The largest relative
increase in depreciation (74 per cent) was experienced by a firm
The computation of the simulated series is explained in Appendix B. Briefly,
the simulated series assumes that all new acquisitions are depreciated on a twenty-
year service life basis using double declining balance formula.
42Incomparing the increases in actual and simulated depreciation series, per-
centage increases have been used since simulated depreciation was typically lower
than actual depreciation in 1960.42 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
which had made use of the guidelines provisions and had, ac-
cording to the testimony of its controller, received enormous
advantages from "redepreciating" old assets. On the other hand,
the four firms which showed the next highest relative increases
had not made use of the 1962 provisions.
BOOK DEPRECIATION VERSUS TAX DEPRECIATION
There is some reason to expect changes in tax depreciation lib-
eralization to alter the depreciation accounting practices fol-
lowed for other managerial purposes. The reason is clear. Firms
do not like to use different charges for tax and financial account-
ing purposes. Apart from the additional expense of keeping two
sets of books, different charges are difficult to explain to stock-
holders, bankers, employees, and even to fellow executives. They
arouse suspicion and give rise to discrepancies in profit computa-
tions which are difficult to reconstruct and reconcile.
This expectation is abundantly supported by the interview re-
sults. With only one exception, the firms interviewed employed
the same depreciation accounts for determining tax liabilities as
for determining their costs in reporting to stockholders.
It is not surprising that textile firms altered their "book depre-
ciation" accounting to reflect changed "tax depreciation" after the
granting of shorter service lives in 1961 or, for that matter, after
their adoption of the liberalizing provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954. Textile firms have long held that the service
lives indicated in the old Bulletin F were unrealistic and inequi-
table. The industry fought long and hard in Washington to secure
the shorter lives of the 1961 regulation changes and which they
considered to be justified by current replacement requirements.
Having finally gotten what was requested, it was to be expected
that they would alter their bookkeeping arrangements accord-
ingly.
Probably more indicative of the past attitude of treating tax
and book depreciation alike is that the companies did not, see
fit to take the shorter lives, for which they argued so vehemently,
as a basis for computing depreciation in their financial account-DEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 43
ing systems until they were permitted to do so for tax purposes.
Clearly, the firms did not wish to use different depreciation
charges for tax and financial accounting purposes.
The desire to make use of a single system to record deprecia-
tion charges for tax and regular financial accounting purposes
is reflected in executives' attitudes toward taking service lives
shorter than those in force at the time of interview. Executives
were asked if they would adopt ten-year service lives if permitted
to do so without the reserve ratio test, also if they would adopt
five-year service lives.
Among the twenty firms responding to the question seven
stated that they would adopt five-year service lives. Among the
remaining thirteen, five stated that they would go to a ten-year
basis, but not to a five-year basis, and eight stated that they
would not accept service lives as short as ten years.
The interesting aspect of the answers of these thirteen firms is
that in each the executive offered one of two reasons for his un-
willingness to adopt still shorter lives: the firm would be unwill-
ing to have book profits reduced by the additional depreciation
charges which still shorter lives would curtail; or it was felt that
the additional depreciation would not be in accord with actual
depreciation experience.43
In contrast, not one of the seven firms willing to accept five-
year service lives mentioned either the effect of adoption on
profits or the issue of realism.44 It is interesting that four of these
firms stated that they would probably be willing to book depre-
ciation differently for tax than for regular accounting purposes in
the event of shorter service lives. Three of these were firms which
had hitherto been unwilling to follow this practice.
Among the five firms stating that they would accept ten-year service lives but
not five-year service lives three offered the first explanation, two offered the second.
Among the eight firms stating they would accept neither the ten- nor the five-year
service lives four offered the first explanation, four the second.
Theseseven firms were not among the most profitable in the sample although
evidence indicated at least average profitability. An analysis of return on investment
data for the fifteen firms for which data were available failed to establish any
correlation between profitability and willingness to establish shorter-than-current
tax lives. For example, two of the three most profitable firms insisted that tax and
book depreciation lives would have to be the same and "realistic."44 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
To the extent that the evidence offered by our sample firms is
representative of a sizeable segment of the industrial firms of the
nation, the conclusion would seem to be that tax liberalization
which is regarded as recognizing the realities of obsolescence
and physical deterioration of plant and equipment will be adopted
much more readily than will liberalization which accelerates tax
depreciation beyond that point. For our sample it is clear that
a very large majority of firms desired to retain a single accounting
system for tax and general record-keeping purposes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A large majority of firms interviewed promptly adopted the ac-
celerated depreciation permitted by the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 although several delayed adoption for considerable pe-
riods and two had not yet adopted those provisions at time of
interview or had not adopted them for all newly acquired assets.
The 1961 liberalizing provisions were adopted immediately by
all firms, but the impact varied widely, since some firms were
already using lives approximately as short as those permitted by
the new legislation for newly acquired assets while others were
not. The effect of this legislation appears to have been to bring
about increased equality in service lives permitted for tax depre-
ciation.
As regards Revenue Procedure 62-21, at the time of interview
only eight of the twenty-five firms had changed over to the
"guidelines" provisions. The failure to adopt the practices per-
mitted by this legislation was due principally to the conviction
(apparently based upon research into company records) that the
guideline lives were not, on balance, shorter than those permitted
by the 1961 provisions. Moreover, there was a decided reluctance
to change from item depreciation to composite depreciation ac-
counts. This reluctance stemmed from a desire to retain the proof
of service life performance made possible by retention of individ-
ual equipment accounts in dealing with tax agents. Information
relating to attitudes toward the reserve ratio test was not solicited
from all firms but a considerable variety of opinion was expressedDEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE 45
as to how the test would be administered and what its effect
would be.
Finally, the interview evidence indicates that firms interviewed
had a strong preference for using the same depreciation accounts
for tax and general financial accounting. Among the twenty-five
firms, only one made use of separate accounts for tax and "book"
depreciation at time of interview and only four indicated they
would be willing to do so if shorter lives were offered.